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In the two decades after General Augusto Pinochet seized power in 
September 1973, the Chilean economy transformed; a series of orthodox 
and liberal reforms aimed at “liberalisation, stabilisation and 
privatisation” were lauded as a “miracle.” But while hyperinflation was 
reduced and GDP per capita growth restored, most economists agree 
that this came at the cost of a spike in income inequality across the 1970s 
and 1980s. However, our knowledge of this inequality is limited as most 
studies implicitly assume a household survey which only covers the 
capital, Gran Santiago, to be representative of the whole country. This 
dissertation scrutinises this assumption by using novel social tables and 
wage estimates to construct a Gini coefficient time series for the 1980s 
which can be disaggregated by region. First, I demonstrate that 
developments in Gran Santiago were not representative of the whole 
country in the 1980s, before presenting a new national labour income 
inequality series for the period, showing a decline in inequality. While 
this new series is only a partial measure of inequality, it suggests a more 
complicated picture than previous studies, and as such demonstrates the 
need for a reassessment of the relationship between Pinochet’s economic 







Map 1 – Chile’s 13 Regions1 
Source: Cucaluna, “Mapa de Chile por regiones. Para escolares,” cucaluna.com, 
http://www.cucaluna.com/mapa-de-chile-por-regiones-para-escolares/ 
 
1 This map shows Chile’s 13 regions as they were organised in 1976. In this dissertation the 
Metropolitan Region (Región Metropolitana) is referred to as “Gran Santiago” for ease of reference 
and understanding.  
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Introduction 
On the 25th October 2019, more than 1 million Chileans took to the streets of the 
capital, Santiago, to protest the administration of current president, Sebastian 
Piñera.2 The demonstration, united under the slogan “Chile has woken up”, gave 
voice to a broad range of complaints from across the country about pensions, 
health, education, and employment. But while seemingly diverse in nature, these 
grievances were underscored by one common theme: inequality.3 
 
The protestors had good reason to dissent; Chile is one of the most unequal 
developed countries in the world. Among the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), a group of 37 high-income nations, Chile’s 
Gini coefficient ranked third highest, at 46 out of a possible 100 (see figure 1). This 
income inequality also has a regional aspect, with over 60% of the top 10% of 
richest households residing in the Metropolitan Region of Gran Santiago, home of 
Chile’s capital city.4 When did this high level of inequality arise? Chile may have 





2 Deutsche Welle, “Santiago protests: 1 million people take part in 'the biggest march in Chile’,” 
DW.com, 25 October, 2019, https://p.dw.com/p/3RyQ2. 
3 Núcleo Milenio en Desarrollo-Social, “octubre 2019,” Termómetro Social (October 2019): 6-12. 4 
4 PNUD, Desigualdad Regional en Chile: Ingresos, salud y eduación en perspectiva territorial, 





Source: OECD, Income inequality (indicator), accessed on 23 March 2020, 
https://data.oecd.org/inequality/incomeinequality.htm. 
 
Journalists and academics alike have converged on one answer to these questions, 
blaming Chile’s unequal economic development on the liberal and orthodox 
reforms introduced by Augusto Pinochet, who ruled Chile from 1973-1990. This 
may seem surprising: Pinochet’s Chile was once held up as a model for developing 
countries, and had been declared a “miracle” by Milton Friedman in 1982.5 
However, while few challenge the success of Pinochet’s policy of “stabilisation, 
liberalisation and privatisation” in reducing inflation and increasing GDP growth, 
many point out that these policies did not lead to proportional increases in real 
wages, and led to inequalities in access to healthcare and education.6 Do these 
 
5 Sebastian Edwards and Daniel Lederman, “The Political Economy of Unilateral Trade 
Liberalization: The Case of Chile,” NBER Working Paper Series 6510 (April 1998): 1; Milton 
Friedman, “Free Markets and the Generals,” Newsweek, 25 January 1982, 59. 
6 See, for example: Jimmy Langman, “From Model to Muddle: Chile’s Sad Slide into Upheaval,” 
Foreign Policy, November 23, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/23/chile-upheaval-protests-
model-muddle-freemarket/; Amanda Taub, “’Chile Woke Up’: Dictatorship’s Legacy of Inequality 
Triggers Mass Protests,” The New York Times, 3 November, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/03/world/americas/chile-protests.html; Richard Davies, “Why is 
inequality booming in Chile? Blame the Chicago Boys,” The Guardian, 13 November 2019, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/13/why-is-inequality-booming-in-chile-
blamethe-chicago-boys; Kirsten Sehnbruch, “How Pinochet’s economic model led to the current 



















































































































Figure 1 - Gini Coefficients of OECD countries, 2019 (or latest 
year available) 
 5 
narratives have firm empirical backing? Does Chilean inequality really have its 
roots in Pinochet’s dictatorship? Many scholars would argue “yes”, pointing to the 
coincidence of Pinochet’s ascent to power and a large hike in aggregate income 
inequality.7 But the sources used to measure this inequality are unreliable, as they 
implicitly assume developments in the capital, Gran Santiago, to be 
representative of changes in inequality across the whole country.  
 
This dissertation tests this implicit assumption by using novel social tables and 
wage data to estimate a Gini coefficient times series for four Chilean regions from 
1982-1991. I argue that Gran Santiago was not representative of wider trends in 
Chilean inequality, and that income inequality across Chile’s regions was largely 
and persistently heterogenous. Given this finding, I present a new tentative 
estimate of national income inequality in Chile, showing that while total income 
inequality may have increased in Gran Santiago during the 1980s, total labour 
income inequality across the whole country decreased. This new national time 
series is not comprehensive, and requires a large amount of estimation, but 
illustrates the need for a reassessment of income inequality under Pinochet due 
to the limitations of the currently used data. 
 
The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows: section 1 surveys the 
literature on Chilean inequality under Pinochet, explaining the gap that this 
dissertation aims to fill. Then, sections 2 and 3 present the sources and 
methodology employed to create a new time series of income inequality for the 
1980s, which can be disaggregated by region and sector of employment. Section 4 
directly tests the assumption that income inequality in Chile was representative 
of all Chile and finds that it was not. Section 5 then presents my new national 
 
7 Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Entre el neoliberalismo y el crecimiento con equidad: tres décadas de 
política económica en Chile, (Santiago: CEPAL, 2003): 310;  Javier E.  Rodriguez-Weber, “The 
Political Economy of Income Inequality in Chile Since 1850,” in Has Latin American Inequality 
Changed Direction? Eds. L. Bértola and J. Williamson, (New York: Springer, 2017): 49; Javier E. 
Rodriguez-Weber, “La Economía Política de la Desigualdad de Ingreso en Chile, 1850-2009,” 
Tesis de Doctorado en Historia Económica, (Montevideo: Universidad de la República, 2014): 336; 
David E. Hojman, “Poverty and Inequality in Chile: Are Democratic Politics and Neoliberal 
Economics Good for You?” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 38, No. 2/3 (1996): 
77. 
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series of regular labour income inequality and makes brief comments on causality 
and implications for wider research. The paper is concluded in section 6. 
 
 
1. Historical Context and Literature Review 
1.1 Pinochet and the Chilean “miracle”: an introduction 
Before addressing the various sources and methods used to assess inequality 
under Pinochet, it is important to outline the Chilean economic context of the 
1970s and 80s. The traditional economic literature on the Pinochet era 
characterises the combination of orthodox and neoliberal reform as a success, as 
measured by consistent growth in GDP per Capita and decreases in inflation.8 
Indeed, Edwards and Lederman go as far as to characterise Chilean growth in the 
1970s and 1980s “a model for reforming economies around the world,”9 with Milton 
Friedman famously describing Chilean development as an “economic miracle.”10 
 
However, the reality of the “miracle” was more complicated: the timing of the 
miracle, and the policies which caused it are hotly disputed. Typically, economists 
characterise the reforms of the 1970s and 1980s as an orthodox blend of 
“stabilisation, liberalisation and privatisation,” all of which are reforms aimed at 
restoring economic stability and decreasing inflation. Indeed, trade liberalisation, 
the privatisation of formerly state-run companies, and increasingly competitive 
markets have all been credited for Chile’s success.11 However, from the late 1990s, 
 
8 Jose De Gregorio, “Economic Growth in Chile: Evidence, Sources and Prospects,” Banco Central 
de Chile (November 2004): 1-55; Vittorio Corbo and Stanley Fischer, “Lessons from the Chilean 
Stabilisation and Recovery” in The Chilean economy: policy lessons and challenges eds. Barry 
Bosworth, Rudiger Dornbusch and Raúl Labán (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution: 1994). 
Due to the COVID-19 crisis, it has not been possible to find the appropriate page for this reference. 
9 Edwards and Lederman, “Unilateral Trade Liberalization,” 1. 
10 Friedman, “Free Markets.” 
11 Sebastian Edwards, ‘Stabilization with Liberalization: An Evaluation of Ten Years of Chile’s 
Experiment with Free-Market Policies, 1973-1983,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 
33, No. 2 (January 1985): 223-254; Ibid.; Alejandra Cox-Edwards and Sebastian Edwards, “Trade 
Liberalization and Unemployment: Policy Issues and Evidence from Chile,” Cuadernos de 
Economía 33, No 99 (August 1996): 227-250; Edwards and Lederman, “Unilateral Trade 
Liberalization”; Pan A. Yotopoulos, “The (rip) tide of privatisation: Lessons from Chile,” World 
Development 17, No. 5 (1989): 683-702; Oscar Muñoz and Hector Schamis, “Las transformaciones 
del Estado en Chile y la privatización,” in ¿Adónde va América Latina? Eds. Joaquín Vial and 
Eliana A. Cardoso, (Santiago: CIEPLAN, 1992). Due to the COVID-19 crisis, it has not been 
possible to find the appropriate page range for this reference; Vittorio Corbo, “Stabilisation Policies 
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economists began to describe these reforms as “neoliberal”, shifting the emphasis 
from the reduction of inflation to the restoration of market forces.12 But this is 
simplistic; whether the reforms are best classified as orthodox or neoliberal, to 
treat the entire Pinochet period as once policy regime would be a mistake. This is 
best highlighted by Ffrench-Davis, who splits the Pinochet regime into halves, 
from 1974-1981, and 1982 to 1991. The first half he argues, was characterised by 
strict stabilisation policies, trade liberalisation and mixed economic growth, while 
the latter half was characterised by consistent growth marred by recurrent debt 
problems.13 This ties in to the dispute about the timing of the Chilean miracle; 
Edwards argues that trade liberalisation was a success from as early as 1973, 
while Bosworth, Dornbusch, and Labán dismiss such “premature claims of 
success,” arguing instead that the miracle started in earnest from 1983.14 To 
address this vagueness surrounding what constituted the Chilean miracle, table 
1.1 presents a taxonomy of the Chilean economy under Pinochet, identifying four 
distinct periods defined by political events, and changes in inflation, GDP per 










in Latin America: The Decade of Reckoning,” in The Transformation of Latin America: Economic 
Development in the Early 1990s, eds. Frederico Foders, Manfred Feldsieper, (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited, 2000): 11. 
12 Markus J. Kurtz, “Free Markets and Democratic Consolidation in Chile: The National Politics 
of Rural Transformation,” Politics & Society 27 No. 2 (June 1999): 275-301.; Ffrench-Davis, 
Neoliberalismo. 
13 Ffrench-Davis. Entre el neoliberalismo y el crecimiento con equidad: tres décadas de política 
económica en Chile, (Santiago: CEPAL, 2003). 
14 Edwards, “Stabilisation with liberalization”; Barry P. Bosworth, Rudiger Dornbusch and Raúl 
Labán, “Introduction” in The Chilean Economy: Policy Lessons and Challenges, eds. Barry P. 
Bosworth, Rudiger Dornbusch and Raúl Labán (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), 
1-9. 
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Table 1.1  A taxonomy of macroeconomic developments in Chile, 1973-1990. All 






rate of CPI 
(%) 
Average 
growth rate of 
















82.50 +6.63 -0.58 
1981-
1983 
Financial crash and 
recession16 





21.10 +4.65 -1.03 
 
Sources: National Accounts, Chile: Social and Economic Indicators 
 
Firstly, the transition to dictatorship from 1973-5/6 was marked by high inflation 
inherited from the regime of Allende and negative economic growth.17 Following 
this, the orthodox shock policies of 1975 led to a concurrent decrease in inflation 
and consistently strong economic growth, though this was marred by fluctuating 
unemployment. This period was ended by the financial crash of 1981/2, which saw 
unemployment soar to 19.6%, GDP collapse, and slightly higher, somewhat 
stagnating inflation.18 The end of the period, from roughly 1983/4 to 1990 can be 
understood as a stable period of declining unemployment, strong economic growth 
and high, but not hyper, inflation. This context is crucial to understanding the 
results in this dissertation, especially for the discussion of causality in section 5.2. 
 
1.2 The historiography of Chilean inequality 
This is not the only study of trends in income inequality in Chile under Pinochet. 
What sources have been used to measure income inequality in this period? And 
what trends do these sources reveal? This section summarises existing studies of 
 
15 Chile: Social and Economic Indicators only provides figures on the Chilean unemployment rate 
starting in 1976.  
16 For a detailed account of the Chilean crisis of 1982, see Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, “Goodbye 
financial repression, hello financial crash,” Journal of Development Economics 19 (1985): 1-24. 
17 Edwards, “Stabilization with Liberalization,” 223-224. 
18 Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, “Goodbye financial repression.” 
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income inequality in Chile, arguing that the main household survey used to 
capture inequality is not reliable as it is not nationally representative. Then, I 
demonstrate that the literature on regional inequality in Chile is not sufficiently 
developed to compensate for this, as it does not cover the period of 1973-1990 well. 
 
The mainstream literature on income inequality can be divided into two schools. 
The classical school of inequality historians link inequality and industrialisation, 
with Kuznets’ theory that long-run inequality would follow an “inverted U-shape” 
curve sparking furious debate.19 This school uses social tables and household 
surveys to calculate Gini coefficients or extraction ratios over long periods of time, 
making arguments about the link between development and inequality.20 In Latin 
America, these methods have been used to explore when the region’s persistently 
high levels of inequality arose, and when, if it all, they started to decline.21 
However, in more recent years, a second scholarship has emerged. This 
scholarship, pioneered by Piketty, rejects measures of income focusing on the 
whole population distribution, instead arguing that inequality is best captured by 
calculating the income share of society’s richest using administrative tax data.22 
 
Both school’s sources and methods have been employed to assess aggregate income 
inequality in Chile in the 1970s and 80s. Studies within the classical school all use 
a household survey conducted by University of Chile called the Encuesta de 
Ocupación y Desocupación (Survey of Employment and Unemployment, or EOD), 
 
19 Simon Kuznets, “Economic Growth and Income Inequality,” The American Economic Review 45, 
No.1 (March 1995): 4. 
20 See, for example: Peter H. Lindert and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Growth, equality and history,” 
Explorations in Economic History 22, No.4 (1985): 341-377; François Bourguignon and Christian 
Morrison, “Inequality among World Citizens: 1820-1992,” American Economic Review 92, No.4 
(September 2002): 727-744; Branko Milanovic, Peter H. Lindert and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Pre-
Industrial Inequality,” The Economic Journal 121 (March 2010): 255-272. 
21 Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Latin American Inequality: Colonial Origins, Commodity Booms or a 
Missed Twentieth-Century Leveling?” Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 16, No.3 
(2015): 324-341; Leandro Prados de la Escosura, “Growth, inequality, and poverty in Latin 
America: historical evidence, controlled conjectures,” Economic History and Institutions Working 
Paper 04-41(04) (June 2005): 1-45; Luis Bértola and Jeffrey Williamson, Has Latin American 
Inequality Changed Direction? (New York City: Springer, 2017). 
22 See, for example: Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2013); Palma, “Homogenous Middles”; Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, 
“Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 
No.1 (February 2003): 1-39. 
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which records the income of 2,330-3,060 households in the Greater Santiago 
Region every year from June 1957 to the present day.23 Calculating Gini 
coefficients from this source, most agree that income inequality increased 
dramatically from 1973, before decreasing from 1987.24 Figure 1.1 reconstructs the 
EOD Gini coefficient time series (as presented by Rodriguez-Weber), and shows 
that the Gini coefficient in Gran Santiago rose from 45 in 1973 to over 60 in 1987, 
before then starting to decline.25 Following a more Pikettian methodology, Palma 
uses the EOD data differently, calculating the income share of different 
percentiles of the Chilean wealth distribution, which shows a 50% increase in the 
income share of the top decile of earners from 1973 to 1987.26 Flores et al. apply a 
similar methodology to novel administrative tax data, which also suggests an 
increase in income inequality in the 1970s and 80s, as measured by the income 
shared of the top 1%.27 Both classical and Pikettian studies of Chilean income 
inequality in the 1970s and 1980s, then, show a large increase in inequality across  










23 EOD.  
24 This conclusión is reached by: Ffrench-Davis, Neoliberalismo, 310; Rodriguez-Weber, “Political 
Economy,” 49; Rodriguez-Weber, “Economía Política,” 336; Harald Beyer, “Educación y 
Desigualdad de Ingresos: Una Nueva Mirada”, Estudios Públicos 77 (Summer 2000): 114; Dante 
Contreras, “Distribución del ingreso en Chile. Nueve hechos y algunos mitos,” Perspectivas 311 
(1999): 317; Hojman, “Poverty and Inequality”, 75. 
25 Rodriguez-Weber, “Political Economy,” 49. 
26 Palma, “Homogenous Middles,” 134. 
27 Ignacio Flores, Claudia Sanhueza, Jorge Atria and Ricardo Mayer, “Top incomes in Chile: a 




However, while the inequality literature on the period appears to have reached a 
consensus, there are many reasons to doubt the sources used to reach these 
conclusions. The tax data used by Flores et al. is most obviously flawed; the data 
does not exist for a large part of the 1980s, leaving a gap in our understanding of 
inequality.28 But the EOD, used by Palma to calculate income shares, and many 
others to calculate Gini coefficients, is victim to a more subtle limitation. Although 
it is rarely explicitly acknowledged, the EOD only includes households in the 
Metropolitan Region of Gran Santiago, and as is such not nationally 
representative.29 Ffrench-Davis goes the furthest towards acknowledging this 
limitation of the EOD, by accepting that the survey only covers “40% of the 




30 Ffrench-Davis, Neoliberalismo, 310. 
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increasing under Pinochet is “irrefutable.”31 This is not true. Rodriguez-Weber 
shows that the EOD suggests different trends in inequality than the nationally 
representative Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconomica Nacional (National 
Survey of Socioeconomic Characteristics, or CASEN); the former suggests that 
inequality increased in the 1990s, while the latter suggests that it decreased.32 As 
such, the presumption that Gran Santiago is nationally representative requires 
further scrutiny before being believed. 
 
How might we test this assumption? Ideally, the secondary literature would give 
some indication of the existence, or lack thereof, of regional disparities in Chilean 
development under Pinochet. However, this is sparse, especially in the English 
language. The only studies of Chilean regional inequality that exist are by 
international institutions or non-governmental organisations with the aim of 
understanding modern-day imbalances in levels of GDP per capita across Chile’s 
13 regions, not the historical origins of inequality.33 Dealing with a later period, 
these studies generally show that 1) Chile is a highly unequal country with 2) a 
high concentration of wealth and income in urban areas, (especially the capital 
Santiago) that has 3) experienced a gradual decrease in inequality since 1990, 
particularly after 2000.34 However, due to a lack of regionalised economic data 
before 1990, none of these studies mention trends or patterns in Chilean 
inequality for the Pinochet period of 1973-1990. The only mention of regional 
imbalances under Pinochet comes from Aroca, who shows that that the 
 
31 Ibid., 305. 
32 Rodriguez-Weber, “Economía Política”, 336.  
33 See, for example: PNUD, Desigualdad Regional; ; Heinrich von Baer, Ismael Toloza and Felipe 
Torralbo, Chile Descentralizado… Dessarrollado, CONAREDE (2013): 1-100; Anthony Bebbington, 
Javier Escobal, Isidro Soloaga and Andrés Tomaselli, Poverty, Inequality, and Low Social Mobility: 
Territorial Traps in Chile, Mexico and Peru, (Mexico: RIMSIP, 2016); Patricio Aroca, 
Desigualdades territoriales en Chile: el Rol del Gobierno y del Mercado. (Santiago: CEPAL, 2001); 
Comisión de Desafíos del Futuro Senado de Chile, Retrato de la Desigualdad en Chile (Santiago: 
Chilean Senate, 2018). 
34 Dusan Paredes, Victor Iturra and Marcelo Lufin, “A Spatial Decomposition of Income Inequality 
in Chile,” Regional Studies 50, No.5 (2016): 772; PNUD, Desigualdad Regional, 35.; CONAREDE, 
Fundamentos y Propuestas para construir una Política de Estado (2014-2030) y un nuevo programa 
de gobierno (2014-2018) en descentralización y desarrollo territorial (Santiago: Consejo Nacional 
para la Regionalización y Descentralización, 2013): 23; Senado de Chile, Retrato de la Desigualdad, 
33; Dante Contreras, “Distribución del ingreso”, 320; Susana Katherine Chacón Espejo and Dusan 
Paredes Araya, “Desigualdad Espacial de Ingresos en Chile y su Relación con la concentración de 
capital humano,” El Trimestre Económico LXXXII, No. 326 (April-June 2015): 354. 
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concentration of the population in Gran Santiago increased across the entire 20th 
century, including in the period of 1970-1990.35 Both Foxley and Larraín suggest 
that these imbalances are a consequence of Chile’s highly centralised 
administrative structure, with political and economic power concentrated in 
Santiago since at least the start of the 20th century if not before.36 As such, the 
Chilean regional inequality literature is not sufficiently developed to refute the 
idea that Gran Santiago was nationally representative in the 1970s and 80s, a gap 
which this dissertation attempts to fill. 
 
In brief, this dissertation aims to test one key assumption in the Chilean 
inequality literature; was inequality in Gran Santiago representative of national 
developments in the 1970s and 1980s? The answer to this question has 
implications for our understanding of the relationship between Pinochet’s reforms 
and inequality, as it threatens to cast doubt on the existing consensus that 
inequality rapidly increased in the 1970s and 80s. 
 
 
2. The Chilean National Accounts 
The existing sources on income inequality are insufficient to test Gran Santiago’s 
representativity; Flores et al.’s tax data is not regionally divisible, and the EOD 
does not cover all of Chile.37  As such, this dissertation uses a novel source of data; 
social tables and average wage data from the National Accounts of the Central 
Bank of Chile (henceforth National Accounts). These statistical publications are 
the main source on social economic indicators for Chile and are available in 
monthly volumes at the British Library of Political and Economic Science for the 
whole 20th century.38 This section first suggests that these tables are likely derived 
from a nationally representative household survey. Then, I show that they are 
 
35 Aroca, Desigualdades territoriales, 2. 
36 Aroca, Desigualdades territoriales, 1-4; Alejandro Foxley, Chile y su futuro. Un país posible, 
(Santiago: CIEPLAN, 1987); F. Larraín, Desarrollo Económico en Democracia, (Santiago: Ediciones 
Universidad Católica de Chile, 1987).  
37 The tax data used by Flores et al., “Top Incomes in Chile” is not published. However, Flores 
confirmed to me that this data is not regionally disivible. Ignacio Flores, email to author, November 
4, 2019. 
38 National Accounts. 
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ideal for testing the representativeness of Gran Santiago but are more limited in 
their usefulness for constructing series of income inequality. 
 
2.1 Where does the data come from? 
The provenance of the National Accounts social tables is unclear; the source is 
simply listed as the “Department of Economics, University of Chile”, giving no 
more information about how the data was collected.39 How can we deal with this 
problem? With little information on how the data was collected, it is near 
impossible to assess the underlying methodology. However, by calculating some 
descriptive statistics and comparing them with information from other sources, it 
becomes clear that the survey is broadly representative of the country, even if we 
don’t know how this has been achieved. 
 
Table 2.1.1 compares key descriptive statistics derived from two other sources and 
demonstrates that the social tables produce results in line with other nationally 
representative statistics with less opaque methodologies. For example, the 
National Accounts Social Tables imply an unemployment rate of 19.5% in 1982, 
almost identical to the result of 19.6% calculated from Chile, Social and Economic 
Indicators, a more comprehensive sources of macroeconomic information on Chile. 
Similarly, the number of people reported as working in agriculture, mining, and 
manufacturing are similar in the social tables and census data; any small 
differences are likely due to the seasonality of the data, with censuses collected in 
June rather March.40 The consistency of these statistics when calculated from 
entirely different sources suggests that the social tables used in this dissertation 
are derived from a broad, nationally representative survey, making them a 




39 It is possible that some information on the survey methodology is presented in a volume of the 
National Accounts. However, it has not been possible to access these volumes digitally during the 
COVID-19 crisis, so I have chosen to cite: National Accounts, May 1990, 1251. 
40 I discuss the seasonality of employment in Chile in more detail in section 5.1. 
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Table 2.1.1 – Descriptive statistics of this dissertation’s social tables, compared 































19.1 645,483 78,248 488,340 
 
Sources: Author’s own calculations from: National Accounts; Chile: Social and Economic 
Indicators, 1960-2000; Census 1982 and Census 1992. 
 
2.2 How useful are the National Accounts? 
Now, I demonstrate that the National Accounts are uniquely useful for testing the 
representativeness of Gran Santiago in the 1980s but are limited in their use for 
constructing Gini coefficient time series. To make up for the lack of coverage of the 
EOD, a source must present information on employment and incomes across all of 
Chile’s regions. The social tables upon which this dissertation draws satisfy this 
criterium by presenting the number of workers in 10 different sectors of 
employment across 4 regions from 1982-1991 – the north, centre, south and Gran 
Santiago.41 These regions are not administrative divisions in themselves but are 
groups of the 13 provinces of which Chile was comprised in the 1980s (see map 1). 
That said, they are not arbitrary, and are united by common economic and 
geographic characteristics. As shown in table 2.2.1, the 4 large regions are 
comprised of areas with similar sectoral compositions, levels of GDP per capita, 
and geographical features. Regions in the north are generally dry, cold deserts 
 
41 For an example of one of these social tables, see Appendix 1. 
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which specialise in primary sector activities such as mining and fishing and have 
a medium-high level of GDP per capita. Those in the centre are generally warmer, 
Mediterranean climates with a blend of primary and secondary economic 
activities, mainly mining and manufacturing. The south is characterised by a mix 
of warm Mediterranean and cool oceanic climates and is more characterised by its 
tertiary economic activities in personal services and administration. Gran 
Santiago is an exception, as a capital region with high levels of GDP per capita, 
specialising in financial and business services. As such, the divisions in the 
national accounts social tables are useful for measuring disparities in employment 
and income across the whole of Chile. While an ideal source might divide Chile 
into its 13 regions, the presentation of data on 4 different regions is a large 
improvement on the EOD, which presents data on just one. 
 
However, while the National Accounts social tables are strong in measuring 
developments across all of Chile, this comes at the expense of both time coverage, 
and the resolution of the data. The issue of time coverage is most simple; the social 
tables are published inconsistently, first appearing in 1980, and only appearing 
regularly from September 1982-March 1991, with a gap in 1988. This means that 
this dissertation is only able to directly assess trends in regional income inequality 
in the second half of Pinochet’s rule. To overcome this problem, I use both census 
data and information from CASEN to postulate ex-post and ex-ante trends in 
Chilean regional development which may indicate how regional income inequality 
disparities developed before and after the 1980s.42 I consider these two sources to 
be reliable, as both are large-scale, nationally representative population surveys 
which collect microdata on incomes, employment, migration, and education.43 
Furthermore, the limited coverage of the source is only a problem to a limited 
extent; while it limits the length of the Gini coefficient time series presented in 
 
42 Chile Atiende, “Información estadística y metodológica sobre la encuesta CASEN,” Last 
updated 2 January 2020, accessed 12 April 2020, https://www.chileatiende.gob.cl/fichas/2164-
informacion-estadistica-y-metodologica-sobre-la-encuesta-casen. 
43 The fact that the Chilean censuses are nationally representative is highlighted here: Global 
Health Data Exchange, “Chile Population and Housing Census 1970,” accessed 12 April 2020, 
http://ghdx.healthdata.org/record/chile-population-and-housing-census-1970. The 
representativeness of CASEN is discussed in detail in Chile Atiende, “Información Estadística.” 
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sections 5 and 6, the period of a decade is long enough to test whether trends in 
income inequality in Gran Santiago reflected those in Chile as a whole. 
 




















I - Tarapacá Desert Mining Primary High 
II – Antofagasta Desert Mining Primary High 
III - Atacama Desert Mining Primary Medium 
IV - Coquimbo Desert Mining Primary Low 
Centre 
 
V – Valparaíso Cold semi-arid Manufacturing Secondary Medium 
VI – O’Higgins 
Warm summer 
Mediterranean 
Mining Primary Medium 
VII - Maule 
Warm summer 
Mediterranean 
Manufacturing Secondary Low 
South 
 
VIII – Bíobío 
Warm Summer 
Mediterranean 
Manufacturing Secondary Medium 






X – Los Lagos Oceanic Manufacturing Secondary Low 
























Sources: climate-data.org46; National Accounts. 
 
The second issue with the National Accounts is more problematic; they do not give 
a full picture of Chile’s income distribution. The social tables upon which this 
dissertation draws present the number of workers in 10 different sectors of 
employment across 4 regions from 1982-1991). Unlike the EOD, these social tables 
do not include the number of people unemployed, nor the type of occupation of the 
 
44 I wanted to use the National Accounts to calculate this for 1980 but have not been able to access 
the information due to the Covid-19 crisis. Information from Chilean National Accounts 2014. 
45 For illustrative purposes, the GDP per capita of each region in 1982 has been grouped into 
categories of “high”, “medium”, or “low.” The category boundaries are as follows in 1996 pesos. Low: 
GDP per Capita < 1,000,000 pesos. Medium = 1,000,000< GDP per Capita < 1,500,000 pesos. High= 
GDP Capita > 1,500,000 pesos.  
46 Climate Data, “Chile Climate,” climate-data.org, accessed 23 May, 2020. https://en.climate-
data.org/south-america/chile-75/. 
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worker, such as employer or employee. Neither do they include any non-labour 
income, such as pensions or gifts. The first problem was easily solved – the 
relevant information on regional unemployment is taken from Chile: Social and 
Economic Indicators.47 The second problem, however, could not be resolved as no 
information on the distribution of types of employment within sectors is available 
in any of the major sources of Chilean statistics.48 This limits the extent to which 
the sources can be used to capture income inequality because it is not possible to 
differentiate the wages of workers within a sector. It is impossible, for example, to 
distinguish between high-salary business owners and their low-wage employees. 
This problem concerns the resolution of the data and biases my Gini coefficients 
downwards; by forcing the use of average wages for all workers within large 
sectors, variation within professions and within sectors is inevitably lost. 
However, as this dissertation is focused on trends in inequality, this limitation of 
resolution is not fatal. As such, while imperfect, the sources allow a reasonable 
estimate of regular labour income inequality between sectors for four large 
Chilean regions. 
 
In all, the decision to use the National Accounts social tables for this dissertation 
is well-justified. Firstly, I argue that the data is probably derived from a 
representative survey similar to the later CASEN survey. Then, I show that this 
source offers an improvement on the EOD and tax data. While the National 
Accounts only provide a limited picture of income distributions for a limited 
portion of Pinochet’s rule, these problems are forgivable, and outweighed by the 
uniqueness of the source in capturing trends in income inequality in Chile’s 






47 Chile: Social and Economic Indicators, 392-407 and 434-445. 
48 There are four main sources of economic statistics on Chile: National censuses, the National 
Accounts, Statistical Compendiums and Chile: Social and Economic Indicators. None of these 
sources provide this information. 
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3. Gini coefficients and wage estimates 
The methodology employed in this dissertation is broadly determined by the 
nature of the sources used. While inequality can be measured by income share or 
distributional measures (see section 1.2) the former is not possible as the National 
Accounts data only presents information on incomes at a sectoral, rather than 
individual level. As such, this dissertation uses a distributional measure of income 
inequality (a Gini coefficient), despite some claiming that Chilean inequality is 
“all about the share of the rich.”49  This section outlines the methodology used to 
test the assumption that inequality in Gran Santiago is indicative of all Chile, as 
well as how this data is then used to estimate a novel regular labour income Gini 
coefficient time series. 
 
3.1 Testing for representativeness 
Most hypothesis testing in Economic History is performed by regressing a 
dependent variable on an independent variable, controlling for compounding 
factors. Rodriguez-Weber shows that this is not appropriate for measuring 
inequality which “cannot be studied as the single outcome of market forces” due 
to the idiosyncrasies of institutions and power relations which shape how income 
is  distributed.50   As such, this dissertation does not attempt to formally test the 
assumption that  income inequality in Gran Santiago is representative of trends 
across Chile, instead choosing to simply illustrate heterogenous trends in 
inequality by constructing a distributional measure, the Gini coefficient. 
 
The first step towards creating a Gini coefficient is to assign a wage to each 
employment sector detailed in the social tables. This process is relatively 
straightforward; national average wages are presented in a relatively uniform way 
in the National accounts. Although these are not regionalised, these figures can 
still be used as it is the relative income of different sectors that matters for 
calculating a Gini coefficient, not their absolute value. That said, as shown in table 
3.1.1, 4 of the 10 employment categories do not fit perfectly. Generally, the 
 
49 Palma, “Homogenous Middles”, 87. 
50 Rodriguez-Weber, “Political Economy”, 45. 
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mismatches are of minor significance; I do not expect the average wage of 
“personal and household services” workers to be very different from “personal 
services workers”, for example.  Two of these discrepancies are worth explaining, 
though. Firstly, given the lack of more detailed data, wages for the category 
“transport, storage, communications, and public utilities” are simply estimated as 
the equally weighted average of the wages provided for “transport and 
communications” and “electricity, gas, and water.” Moreover, the national 
accounts do not list wages for the category “agriculture, hunting, forestry, and 
fishing.” As such, wages for the category “unskilled workers” are used a proxy for 
these wages, as these are four sectors characterised by unskilled labour. The need 
to approximate average wages for these categories casts doubt on the veracity of 
the estimated Gini coefficients which are eventually constructed. As perfectly 
accurate wage data does not exist, it is not certain that the Gini coefficients are 
completely accurate. This is not so strong a limitation as to invalidate my 
estimates, though. Only 4 of 10 income categories require approximation, and 
while we do not have perfect information on wages, it is reasonable to expect that 

















Table 3.1.1 – Categories of employment and wages in the National Accounts 
Category in Social Tables 





forestry, and fishing 
Unskilled workers No 
Exploitation of mines and 
quarries 
Mining Yes 
Manufacturing industries Manufacturing Yes 
Construction Construction Yes 
Trade 
Retail and wholesale trade, 
restaurants and hotels 
Yes 
Government and financial 
services 
Financial services and insurance No 
Personal and household 
services 
Personal service workers No 
Social and community 
services 
Social and community services Yes 
Transport, storage, 
communications, and public 
utilities 
Numerical average of “transport 
and communications” and 
“electricity, gas, and water” 
No 
Source: National Accounts 
 
These wage and income categories are then converted into an estimated Gini 
coefficient. Gini coefficients are a well-established means of measuring inequality 
in a country by measuring how far the inequality in a population deviates from 
hypothetical “perfect inequality” in which everyone in the economy has the same 
income.51 This coefficient ranges between 0, or perfect equality and 100, or perfect 
inequality. For the purposes of this dissertation, the Gini coefficient is only 
“estimated” because data on the wages of each individual is not available. As such, 
each category of worker is sorted by income from lowest to highest, and the 
trapezium method is used to linearly interpolate inequality within each category. 
The method divides the Lorenz curve into trapezia and adds their area together to 
provide an estimate of the area under the curve. The Gini coefficient is calculated 
by subtracting this number from 0.5 and multiplying it by 2 to create a measure 
of how far the Lorenz curve is from perfect equality. The trapezium method likely 
underestimates the actual inequality within each category, as the richest in each 
 
51Jim Chappelow, “Gini Index,” Investopedia, last updated February 3 2020, accessed May 23 2020, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gini-index.asp. 
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sector are likely to make disproportionately more money than the poorest, which 
is not captured by simple linear interpolation.52 This point is illustrated in figure 
3.1.1: the area of the trapezium ABCD is larger than the area between the Lorenz 
Curve AB and the x axis, thus overestimating the area under the curve and 
underestimating the Gini coefficient.  
 
 
However, as data on the distribution of incomes within categories is not available, 
this trapezium method presents a reasonable estimate of the Gini coefficient 
without guessing distributions of income within sectors. 
 
These regional Gini coefficients are the most appropriate way to measure 
inequality given the nature of the National Accounts social tables. While the 
economic literature tends to prefer income share measures, these would not suit 
the data, and as such showing differences in Gini coefficients is the only feasible 
means of testing how representative Gran Santiago is. 
 
52 For a full explanation of the use and limitations of the trapezium method to estimate Gini 
coefficients, see Johan Fellman, “Estimation of Gini coefficients using Lorenz curves”, Journal of 
Statistical and Econometric Methods 1, No. 2 (2012): 31-38. 
A 
B 
C D Cumulative percentage 
of the population 
Cumulative 
percentage of income 
Source: author’s own visualisation based on Fellman, “Estimation of Gini coefficients”. 
Figure 3.1.1 – A stylized portion of a Lorenz Curve illustrating the trapezium method 
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3.2  Estimating national Gini coefficients 
As the test in section 4 shows that Gran Santiago is not representative, this 
dissertation estimates a new national Gini coefficient to tentatively demonstrate 
that trends in inequality are different when measured from a national source than 
one which just covers the capital. The creation of this national Gini coefficient 
series requires large amounts of estimation, and as such is only considered 
tentative. 
 
Firstly, the available wage data only provides average national monthly wages for 
each category, not reflecting variation in the level of wages across different 
regions. As such, this dissertation constructs two multipliers to proxy regional 
variation in labour incomes, one based on differences in regional GDP, the other 
based on regional differences in minimum wages. The regional GDP multiplier 
assumes that as regions become more productive, GDP per capita will increase, 
and some of this is likely to passed through to workers as an increase in wages. As 
such wages are adjusted by the ratio of GDP per capita in the region in question 
to national GDP per capita, as calculated from Regional GDP Data.53 The 
minimum wage multiplier assumes that regional variation in average wages in 
each sector is proportionate to regional variation in minimum wages. However, 
the regional values of minimum wages, available in Chile’s “Compendio 
Estadístico” cannot be accessed from the UK for all years, leaving a gap in the data 
from March 1984 to August 1987.54 To fill this gap, I linearly interpolate minimum 
wage values for the intervening period. 
 
How can this assumption of linearity be justified? After all, minimum wages move 
in steps, as each increase in minimum wage requires legislation to be passed, 
which might lead us to expect changes in minimum wages to be anything but 
linear. However, the justification lies in the way that minimum wages are 
calculated in Chile: while the level of minimum wages may change, the 
proportional difference in minimum wages between regions stays fixed. For 
 
53 For a full specification of these estimations, see appendix 2. 
54 See Bibliography for more details of this source’s availability. 
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example, the minimum wage of Gran Santiago in March 1981 was 98.6% of the 
unweighted national average minimum wage and remained so in March 1990. The 
use of linear (rather than exponential) interpolation allows these ratios to be 
preserved, in turn allowing estimates of regional wages to maintain 
proportionality. 
 
Table 3.2.1 – Multipliers resultant from different wage estimation techniques, 
















1.075 1.097 1.046 
Midlands 
(Regions V-VII) 
0.884 0.781 0.976 
South (Regions 
VIII-XII) 
0.923 0.724 1.006 
Santiago 1.057 1.122 1.004 
Sources: Author’s own calculations from National Accounts, CASEN and Statistical 
Compendiums 
 
While neither of these estimation techniques is completely theoretically robust, 
they reflect real differences in wages well. Table 3.2.1 compares the multipliers in 
real wages derived from minimum wage and GDP per capita differences to actual 
differences in real wages taken from CASEN in 1990. The 2 estimated multipliers 
are generally above 1 when the CASEN-derived multiplier is also above 1, 
meaning that the estimated multipliers accurately reflect variations in the level 
of wages between regions. Furthermore, the magnitudes of these multipliers are 
similar, with the average difference between the estimated multiplier and the 
actual multiplier less than 0.1 for both specifications.55 That said, the GDP per 
capita multiplier tends to over-exaggerate regional differences, while the 
minimum wage multiplier tends to under-exaggerate them. As such, these two 
 
55 The average difference between the GDP per capita multiplier and the actual multiplier is 0.0969 
(3 significant figures). The average difference between the minimum wage multiplier and the 
actual multiplier is 0.0643 (3 significant figures). 
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multipliers are a reasonable estimate of regional variations in labour incomes for 
1982-1991, with GDP per capita estimates providing an upper-bound of regional 
differences, and minimum wage estimates a lower-bound. 
 
In all then, the methodology of this dissertation is largely constrained by the 
sources available. The use of Gini coefficients as a measure of inequality across 4 
regions is justified by the resolution of the data prohibiting the use of any 
alternative measures, and this illustrative method is appropriate for testing the 
literature’s assumptions about Gran Santiago’s representativeness. However, 
when it comes to combining these regional Gini coefficients into a national Gini 
coefficient time series, the results are much more tentative, relying heavily on 
estimates of regional differences in wages based on GDP per capita and minimum 
wage multipliers. As such, the results presented in section 4 are much more 
reliable than the speculations of section 5. 
 
 
4. Was Gran Santiago representative? 
As outlined in section 1, the current literature on income inequality under 
Pinochet implicitly assumes that income inequality in Gran Santiago is 
representative of developments across the whole country. If this assumption is 
correct, then there is reason to be confident in the current consensus that income 
inequality increased in the 1970s and 1980s. However, if this assumption does not 
hold, then this consensus is cast under serious doubt. If the sources with which 
inequality is measured are unrepresentative, then more work must be done to 
establish how inequality really changed across all of Chile. This section first 
outlines some reasons to suspect that income inequality in Gran Santiago might 
not be nationally representative. Then, I present a Gini coefficient time series for 
4 Chilean regions which confirms this suspicion. Far from being regionally 
homogenous, I argue, trends and levels in income inequality differed widely across 
regions, with a particular gulf between developments in Gran Santiago and the 
north, and the centre and south. 
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4.1 Internal Migration and Regional GDP: a smoking gun? 
Section 1 demonstrated that the literature on regional inequality in Chile is 
underdeveloped as it does not cover the Pinochet era in any detail, and therefore 
does not provide sufficient grounds to suggest that Gran Santiago is not 
representative of all Chile. This section constructs two simple indicators to 
address this; I argue that long-term trends in internal migration and GDP per 
capita reveal regional imbalances that justify the speculation that Gran Santiago 
is not representative of the whole country. 
 
The first indication that Chile’s regions are not homogenous comes from its 
internal migration rates. While internal migration is often considered as a force 
for reducing regional inequality, it may also be indicator of persistent regional 
imbalances if it shows that people persistently moved towards or away from a 
particular area.56 Spitzer and Zimran demonstrate that internal migration is 
negatively selective, meaning that migrants are most likely to move from poor 
regions to richer ones.57 As such, if a country witnesses persistently high internal 
migration rates, then this is evidence of regional heterogeneity; a net inflow to 
region A from region B suggests that region A is a relatively appealing place to 
live  
 
56 See, for example, Francisco Rowe and Patricio Aroca, “Eficiencia de la migración interregional 
en Chile para ajustar el mercado laboral,” A-MÉRIKA 1, No. 2 (December 2008): 1-19. 
57 Yannay Spitzer and Ariell Zimran, “Migrant self-selection: Anthropometric evidence from the 
mass migration of Italians to the United States, 1907-1925,” Journal of Development Economics 
134 (2018): 226-247. 
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Are such regional imbalances present in Chile in the long run? Map 4.1.1 presents 
the internal net migration rates (i.e., the number of immigrants minus the number 
of emigrants as a percentage of the region’s population) for Chile in the 5 census 
periods of 1960, 1970, 1982, 1992, and 2002, aggregated across our four larger 
regions. In each year, the censuses provide the number of those dwelling in each 
region in the year of the census, and where they lived 5 years before.  This rate of 
migration is then annualised (i.e., divided by 5) to give an average net annual 
internal migration rate for each large region. Regions which are net recipients of 
internal migrants are coloured in blue, and net providers of internal migrants are 
coloured in red. The more intense the shade, the higher the rate of net migration.58 
 
58 Before 1976, Chile was not divided into 13 regions, but 25 provinces, as described here: Statoids. 
“Regions of Chile.” Accessed 12 April 2020. http://www.statoids.com/ucl.html. Figure 1970 
recalculates migration rates for this period to make them directly comparable with the periods 
after. This method was originally explained in Francisco Rowe, “The Chilean Internal Migration 
(CHIM) database: A Temporally Consistent Spatial Data Framework for the Analysis of Human 
Mobility,” Region 4, No. 3 (2017): R2. 
Source: Census Data, 1960-2000 
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The main takeaway from this map is that Chile was characterised by regional 
imbalances across the entire second half of the 20th century. Gran Santiago was a 
net recipient of migrants across every 5-year period in the data until 1997-2002, 
implying that it was a relatively appealing place to live compared to the south, 
centre, and north from at least 1955. Indeed, the south lost inhabitants to other 
regions consistently across the period, losing 6.17% of its population to internal 
migration per year from 1977-1982. The final important feature of the map is that 
the north became a net recipient of migrants in 1965-1970 and remained so for 
most of the rest of the period; the slight net emigration of 1977-1982 saw an 
insignificant 0.4% of the population leave every year. As such, not only were 
regional imbalances benefitting Gran Santiago a feature of the Chilean economy 
across the late 20th century, but the pattern of these imbalances shifted some time 
after 1960, with the north beginning to benefit relative to the centre and south. 
This evidence of regional imbalance is suggestive of the unrepresentative nature 
of Gran Santiago – it was exceptionally attractive for internal migrants across the 
20th century, suggesting that it was not a typical Chilean region. Furthermore, 
internal migration does not just tell a story of “Gran Santiago vs. the rest”; the 
relative attractiveness of the north, capital, and south also shifted across the 
period. 
 
Another simple indicator of regional imbalances is regional disparity in real GDP 
per capita, as this reflects differing levels of productivity across Chile’s different 
regions. Figure 4.1.1 shows the real GDP per capita of Chile’s four regions from 
1960-1992, and demonstrates that, from the start of Pinochet’s rule in 1973,  
growth in GDP per capita was much stronger in Gran Santiago and the north than 
in the centre and the south.59 The divergence of the north from the south and the 
centre under Pinochet is particularly interesting; while Gran Santiago had been 
significantly wealthier than the rest of the country since at least 1960, the north 
and centre had historically experienced similar levels of GDP per capita. However, 
the gap between the two increased dramatically under Pinochet, with the north’s 
 
59 GDP per capita = Real GDP of region (constant 1996 pesos)/Population of Region. Data from 
Regional GDP Data and Population Data.  
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real GDP per capita increasing from just 8% higher than the centre’s in 1970 to 
over 40% higher in 1990. This information further colours our expectations of the 
representativeness of Gran Santiago; at some point under Pinochet’s rule, the 
north and capital diverged from the south and centre, adding to the evidence of 




This section, in the absence of a developed secondary literature on Chilean 
regional inequality under Pinochet, adds weight to the speculation that 
developments in the capital were probably not representative of all of Chile in the 
1970s and 1980s. I find that in terms of internal migration and GDP per capita, 
Chile was heterogenous across the second half of the 20th century, with 
developments in the north and capital differing widely from those in the centre 
and south. This fits with the findings of the existing regional literature on the 
period after Pinochet – the United Nations Development Programme (PNUD), for 
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example, finds that a dichotomy between the north and capital and the south and 
centre still exists today.60 
 
4.2. Regional Gini coefficients 
Now that case for Chile’s regional heterogeneity in the 1970s and 80s has been 
made, I turn to answering the narrow question of this dissertation directly: were 
trends in inequality in Gran Santiago representative of trends across all of Chile 
under Pinochet? This section provides a simple answer to this question: “no”. Here, 
I present my estimated regular labour income Gini coefficient time series for 
Chile’s four large regions, showing that while 1) all regions experienced a general 
decline in regular labour income from September 1982-March 1991 and that 2) 





60 PNUD, Desigualdad Regional, 31. 
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Figure 4.2.1 presents my estimates of income inequality within the four Chilean 
regions of the north, centre, south and Gran Santiago, using the Gini coefficient 
methodology explained in section 3.1. An initial reading of the graph might 
suggest that Chile’s regions were somewhat homogenous; the Gini coefficient of 
all four regions declines from the start of the period in September 1982 to the end 
in March 1991. However, three characteristics of the figure refute this 
interpretation. 
 
The first important observation from this figure is that levels of income inequality 
in Chile from 1982-1991 were highly regionally heterogenous; the estimated Gini 
coefficients vary widely between regions. For example, in September 1982, the 
estimate Gini coefficient ranged from 48.02 in Gran Santiago to 56.12 in the centre 
regions.61 This range of Gini coefficients persisted across the period, with the 
difference between the largest and smallest Gini coefficient 4.64 by March 1991. 
While this is lower than the range of Gini coefficients in 1982, this is unimportant; 
while the Chilean regions may have been decreasingly heterogenous across the 
period, they were never homogenous. The implications of this finding are simple. 
If labour income Gini coefficients differed across regions in the 1980s, then the 
literature’s current estimates of levels of inequality under Pinochet are rendered 
unreliable for only including Gran Santiago in their calculations. 
 
The second significant feature of figure 4.2.1 is that regular labour income 
inequality between sectors was lowest in Gran Santiago across most of the period, 
being lower than all other regions from 1982-1986 and 1988-1991. This result 
seems particularly surprising given the results in the literature for the period after 
1990; a Chilean Senate report on territorial inequality demonstrates that Gran 
Santiago had the highest income inequality of any of the 13 regions in 2006, 
something which the PNUD also reports for 2017.62 This might suggest that there 
was a reversal of regional differences in inequality at some point between 1991 
and 2006. However, this is inaccurate due to the differences in the categories of 
 
61 Author’s own elaboration on National Accounts and Chile: Social and Economic Indicators. 
62 Senado de Chile, Retrato de la Desigualdad, 36; PNUD, Desigualdad Regional, 45. 
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income capture by these studies and this dissertation. Both the Chilean Senate 
and PNUD use CASEN, which measures not just regular labour income, but also 
bonuses, gifts, state transfers, and pensions.63 As such, these two findings do not 
directly contradict each other: while Gran Santiago may have been the most 
unequal region in Chile in terms of total income inequality (as seen in the 
literature), this was not due to differences in average regular labour incomes 
between sectors (as measured in this dissertation). This further adds to the case 
against Gran Santiago’s representativeness; it was characterised by relatively low 
levels of regular labour income inequality under Pinochet, compared to the north, 
centre, and south. 
 
The final important conclusion from figure 4.2.1 is that the rate of decrease in 
inequality varied rapidly between sectors. While Gran Santiago and the north 
experienced inequality decreases at a roughly consistent rate across the period, 
the decline in the south and centre was less consistent, experiencing a sharp drop 
from March 1985 to March 1986. What explains this difference? When the 
underlying social tables are examined, the increase in inequality in the centre and 
south can be explained by a large change in agricultural wages between March 
1985 and March 1986. In this period, the nominal wage of unskilled workers 
increased from 29,677 pesos per month to 37,007, which reduced inequality by 
increasing the income share of Chile’s poorest workers.64 As can be seen in table 
4.2.1, this change in wages had a large effect in the south and the centre, where 
more than 25% of workers were in agriculture, compared with just 14.1% and 3.1% 
in the north and Gran Santiago respectively. This explains the variation in 1985-
6 well; those regions with a higher proportion of workers in agriculture 
experienced a sharper decrease in inequality. In the south, this decrease was 
exacerbated by a sudden decrease in employment in “government and financial 
services” of 48.9% in one year. As this was the highest-earning sector in 1985, this 
change in employed decreased the proportion of the population on the highest 
 
63 Ministerio Desarrollo y Social, “Cuestionario 1992”, ministerioiodesarrollosocial.gob.cl, 
accessed May 23 2020, available at 
http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/layout/doc/casen/cuestionario_1992.pdf, 5. 
64 Chile: Social and Economic Indicators, 489-496.  
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income dramatically, which explains why the south experienced a larger decrease 
in Gini coefficient than any other sector. 
 
Table 4.2.1 Changes in inequality and proportion of workers in agriculture, 
hunting, forestry and fishing, 1985-1986 
Region 
Change in estimated Gini 
coefficient, March 1985 – 
March 1986 
Percentage of workers in 
agriculture, hunting, forestry and 
fishing, March 1985 (%) 
North -1.08 14.10 
Centre -6.79 27.48 





Source: Author’s own elaboration on the National Accounts 
 
In all then, the regular labour income Gini coefficient series produced here points 
to three conclusions: levels of income inequality in Chile’s 4 largest regions were 
highly heterogenous; Gran Santiago had persistently lower regular labour income 
inequality than other countries, and the rate of decline in inequality varied due to 
differences in the sectoral composition of each region. All three of these conclusions 
offer rebuttals to the assumption outlined in section 1 that the EOD’s data on Gran 
Santiago is representative of wider trends in inequality across Chile under 
Pinochet. One key limitation to this finding is that the Gini coefficient time series 
does not cover the first half of Pinochet’s dictatorship. However, this is offset by 
the figures in section 4.1 which demonstrate regional imbalances to be a 
characteristic of the Chilean economy across the entire second half of the 20th 
century. Thus, while this study does not provide specific detail of regional 
heterogeneity in income distributions from 1973-1981, it is reasonable to speculate 
that it did exist. As such, Ffrench-Davis’ assertion that existing knowledge of 
Chilean income inequality is “irrefutable” is inaccurate.65 Most assessments of 
inequality assume the regional data presented in the EOD to be nationally 
representative which, as this section has shown, was not true. 
 
 
65 Ffrench-Davis, Neoliberalismo, 305. 
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5. Towards a new understanding of Chilean income inequality 
The previous section leaves one large question unanswered. If we cannot trust the 
EOD as a source on Chilean income inequality at a national level under Pinochet, 
what can we know about income inequality? This question is far broader than the 
narrow question asked in section 4 and can only be partially answered. Section 5.1 
presents two estimates of regular labour income inequality at a national level, as 
explained in section 3.2. The results suggest that rather than increasing, labour 
income inequality actually decreased in Chile across the 1980s. However, due to 
the amount of estimation required and the limited category of income covered, I 
argue that this does not conclusively contradict the suggestion in the EOD that 
total income inequality increased across the period. Section 5.2 then analyses the 
proximate causes of the measured decrease in income inequality across the period, 
arguing that a decrease in unemployment, not a convergence of wages, drove the 
change. 
 
5.1. National Gini coefficient time series 
Converting the regional Gini coefficient estimates in section 4.2.1 to an estimate 
national Gini coefficient time series is not simple. As Gini coefficients are not 
additionally decomposable, it is not possible to produce a national Gini coefficient 
by simply adding the regional Gini estimates together.66 Indeed, a large amount 
of estimation is required to combine these Gini coefficients, with the results in this 
section based on 2 different estimators of regional disparities in wages, derived 
from differences in Real GDP per Capita (estimate 1) and minimum wages 
(estimate 2).67 
 
That said, the national Gini coefficients presented here are a “best guess” of 
Chilean labour income inequality. What trends do they show? Figure 5.1.1 
presents my two estimates for Chile’s Gini coefficients from September 1982 to 
 
66 This point differentiates Gini coefficients from the more complex Theil index, which would not 
have been appropriate for use with this data. For a full explanation of how additively decomposable 
distributional measures of income inequality work, see: A. F. Shorrocks, “The Class of Additively 
Decomposable Inequality Measures,” Econometrica 48, No. 3 (April 1980): 613-625. 
67 These estimates are outlined in section 3, and fully specified in appendix 2.  
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March 1991. The figure shows a somewhat surprising trend: both estimates show 
an overall decrease in income inequality from 1982 to 1991. There are two notable 
exceptions to this. Firstly, the Gini coefficient increases somewhat in the period 
1986-7, from 45.98 to 47.61 (estimate 1) and 46.84 to 47.53 (estimate 2). Secondly, 
while the two estimates produce a similar trend for 1982-1987, the trends differ 
from 1988-1991, with estimate 1 showing a plateau in inequality, while estimate 
2 continues to decrease steadily.  
 
Why might this be? As outlined in section 3, the only difference between estimate 
1 and estimate 2 is the indicator use to create a multiplier for regional variation 
in wages, and as such, the different trend must be a result in differences between 
regional variation in minimum wages and GDP per capita. The answer can be 
found in figure 4.1.1, which demonstrates that the GDP per capita of the north 
and the capital was diverging significantly from the south and the centre. This 
means that the regional wage multiplier in estimate 1 increased over the period 
1988-1991, which puts upwards pressure on the Gini coefficient as it exaggerates 
regional differences in regular labour income. By contrast, the wage multiplier in 
estimate 2 remains almost constant, as the ratio of minimum wages between 
regions remained almost fixed across the period (see section 3). As such, this 
difference in trend between 1988 and 1991 is a result of the difference in 
estimation technique of estimate 1 and estimate 2, which present an upper and 
lower bound of regional income inequality respectively. The real trend in regular 
labour income inequality in this period was likely a gradual decrease – somewhere 






How does this trend of decreasing regular labour income inequality compare to 
our previous understanding of Chilean inequality, based on the EOD? As shown 
in section 1, most estimates of income inequality based on the nationally 
unrepresentative EOD suggest that income inequality increased under Pinochet 
during from 1973 until 1987, at which point it started to decrease.68 However, 
when we focus on the 1980s, we see that the increase until 1987 was not so 
constant: the green line in figure 5.1.2 recreates Rodriguez-Weber’s Gini 
coefficient estimates, showing that inequality actually zig-zagged downwards from 
1982-1986, before spiking upwards suddenly in 1987. Furthermore, the decrease 
in inequality after 1987 is not constant, with a spike in inequality from 1989-1990. 









Figure 5.1.2 compares my estimates to those derived from the EOD, which is used 
by Rodriquez-Weber, Ffrench-Davis and many others.69 An initial reading of the 
graph seems to suggest that my estimates largely contradict the EOD estimates; 
there is a large difference in levels between the two lines, and the trends after 
1986 are very different. For example, while the EOD shows a large spike in 
inequality from 1986-1987 followed by a decrease to 1991, my estimates show a 
much more modest increase from 1986-1987, and a more gradual decrease 
thereafter. It is thus tempting to suggest that this figure directly refutes the 
suggestion that income inequality spiked in 1986-7 across all of Chile. However, 
even when we ignore that the EOD only covers Gran Santiago, there are 2 reasons 
that the data in the EOD and my estimates should not be compared. 
 
69 Ffrench-Davis, Neoliberalismo, 310; Rodriguez-Weber, “Political Economy,” 49; Rodriguez-
Weber, “Economía Política,” 336; Beyer, “Educación y Desigualdad”, 114; Dante Contreras, 
“Distribución del ingreso”, 317; Hojman, “Poverty and Inequality”, 75; Palma, Homogenous 
Middles”, 134. 
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Firstly, the fact that the EOD captures a broader range of income categories might 
explain the difference in levels of the two lines, and the spike from 1986-1987 in 
the EOD which is not observed in my estimates.  The EOD, as a household survey 
which collects a large amount of information from individual households, captures 
many income categories, namely: labour income (wages and salaries); income from 
gifts or payment in specie; income from independent activity; pension income and 
“other” income.70 By contrast, as outlined in section 3, my Gini estimates capture 
only a subset of this income: the average regular labour income of 10 different 
sectors. Naturally, my Gini coefficient estimates are consistently lower as they 
capture a small portion of income. Moreover, the spike of 1986-1987 in the EOD 
may have occurred at a national level but is simply not observed in the limited 
portion of income which my estimates capture. This is reconcilable with the 
secondary literature. Palma demonstrates that the income share of the top 10% of 
Chileans increased rapidly in the period preceding 1987.71 As the top 10% of 
earners are not reflected in my estimates, this could provide a strong explanation 
for why the spike in 1987 is not observed. 
 
Another source of difference between my estimates and those in the EOD is the 
month in which the data is collected, with the EOD presenting Gini coefficients 
for June, and my estimates covering March and September. This is significant 
because the high level of seasonality in the Chilean workforce; especially among 
women, low income agricultural labour tended to peak in January to March, then 
decreasing for the rest of the year.72 This could have implications for the labour 
share of income as measured in March – the number of women coming out of 
unemployment and performing seasonal work would cause a decrease in the 
proportion of workers on zero income in my estimates, thus decreasing estimates 
of inequality slightly in March compared to June and September. While the extent 
 
70 EOD. 
71 Palma, “Homogenous Middles,” 134. 
72 Stephanie Barrientos, “The Hidden Ingredient: Female Labour in Chilean Fruit Exports,” 
Bulletin of Latin American Research 16, No. 1 (1997): 75; Robert N. Gwynne and Cristóbal Kay, 
“Agrarian Change and the Democratic Transition in Chile: an Introduction,” Bulletin of Latin 
American Research 16, No. 1 (1997): 8; Anna Bee and Isabel Vogel, “Temporeras and household 
Relations: Seasonal Employment in Chile’s Agro-Export Sector,” Bulletin of Latin American 
Research 16, No.1 (1997): 90. 
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to which this impacts my estimates is impossible to quantify, it is likely to have a 
significant effect; Barrientos suggests that seasonal employment during fruit 
harvests saw almost 300,000 Chileans gain temporary work in January-March 
1992, a number which would largely downwards bias estimates of inequality in 
March compared to June and September.73 
 
This section supports two conclusions. Firstly, my estimates of national Gini 
coefficients decrease across the whole period, save for a small spike in inequality 
from 1986-7. While this trend is different to that identified in the EOD, these 
differences might not just arise from differences in geographical coverage; my 
sources and the EOD also differ in the categories of income and the time of year 
that they capture. As such, it would be rash to argue that these Gini coefficients 
dismiss the conventional wisdom that inequality increased in Chile during the 
1980s. It would also be inaccurate to use this discrepancy to make claims about 
the veracity of the EOD for the whole Pinochet period; a nationally representative 
series of income inequality for all of 1973-1990 would need to be constructed before 
our existing understanding could be dismissed. However, it is fair to say that my 
estimated Gini coefficient time series for 1982-1991 casts some initial doubt on 
this claim, as while total income inequality may have increased across Chile in 
this period, this was not due to an increase in regular labour income inequality. 
While more work must be done to fully evaluate claims based on the EOD, this 
section illustrates that its findings should not be treated as conclusive.  
 
5.2. What might explain decreasing regular labour income inequality? 
Before concluding, I ask one last question: what drove the decrease in regular 
labour income inequality seen in my estimates? Here, I analyse the proximate 
causes of changes in national income inequality presented above, arguing that a 
decrease in unemployment, rather than wage convergence, explain the decrease 
in regular labour income inequality.  
 
73 Barrientos, “The Hidden Ingredient,” 74. 
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Any decrease in my estimates of regular labour income inequality must be 
explained by either the wages received by any group of workers, or the proportion 
of workers in any sector of the economy. Which of these explains the decrease 
witnessed across all regions in the 1980s? Figure 5.2.1 demonstrates that the 
decline inequality was note a result of wage convergence between high-income and 
low-income sectors. I group the 10 sectors in the social tables into 3 categories of 
“high-income”, “medium-income”, and “low-income” and index them to wages in 
the high-income group. The result shows that, relative to high-income wages, 
medium-income and low-income wage were stagnant. This means that the 
decrease in inequality outlined in section 5.1 cannot be a result of wage 
convergence, as the wages of the poor did not increase relative to the wages of the 
rich. 
 41 
Instead, I argue that the largest driving force behind the decrease in labour income 
inequality in the 1980s was a decrease in the level of unemployment as the country 
recovered from the 1982 crash. As seen in section 4.1, unemployment was at a high 
of almost 20% in 1982, decreasing consistently thereafter until 1989.74 This would 
have reduced regular labour income inequality as the proportion of the population 
with zero labour income decreased over time, thus putting downwards pressure 
on the Gini coefficient. Indeed, this relationship is somewhat confirmed by figure 
5.3.2, which shows that the two regions which experienced the largest decreases 
in unemployment in the 1980s, i.e. the south and the centre, were also those which 
experienced the fastest decrease in inequality. This conclusion suggests that, 
rather than being a consequence of equitable economic policies, the continuous 
reduction in labour income inequality in the 1980s was driven by “cheap gains” of 
unemployment reduction which occurred naturally after the crisis of 1982. 
 
 
74 Chile: Social and Economic Indicators, 392-445. 
 42 
This interpretation of the proximate cause of the decline in income inequality in 
the 1980s has implications for our wider understanding of the relationship 
between Pinochet’s economic policy and income inequality. Many explanations 
have been offered for how Pinochet’s orthodox reforms might have impacted 
income inequality, including: the weakening of labour unions and social 
movements; a lack of governmental protection from the negative impacts of 
privatisation and liberalisation; an increasingly powerful elite; an over-reliance on 
handouts that neglected the middle of the income distribution, and poor access to 
higher education.75 The data presented in this dissertation do not go far enough to 
address the veracity of these claims in details, due to the complexity of testing the 
causes of inequality, as noted by Rodriguez-Weber.76 However, when evaluating 
candidate causes of changes in inequality under Pinochet, future studies must 
identify a policy shift which would cause total income inequality to rise in Gran 
Santiago, even as regular labour income inequality declined across the country. 
 
In summation, section 5 has gone some way towards addressing the questions left 
unanswered in section 4. If Gran Santiago is not representative of income 
inequality across all of Chile, then how do my results suggest that the distribution 
of income might have changed across the whole country from 1982-1991? And 
what does this tell us about the impact of Pinochet’s economic policies on 
inequality? Neither has been answered fully.  However, section 5.1 demonstrates 
that while total income inequality may have increased across the 1980s, this was 
not due to changes in regular labour income inequality, which actually declined. 
While doubt has been cast on the veracity of claims about Chilean inequality based 
on the EOD, not enough has been done to fully dismiss the existing consensus that 
total income inequality increased under Pinochet. Then, section 5.2 has shown 
that the proximate cause of decreasing regular labour income inequality in the 
1980s was decreasing unemployment after the 1982 crisis, which has implications 
 
75 Rodriguez-Weber, “Political Economy”, 60-61; Andrés Solimano, “Three Decades of Neoliberal 
Economics in Chile,” UNU-WIDER Rearch Paper 2009/37 (2009): 29-30; Ffrench-Davis, 
Neoliberalismo, 330; Palma, “Homogenous Middles”, 40-49; Hojman, “Poverty and Inequality”, 84; 
Beyer, “Educación y Desigualdad”, 111. 
76 Rodriguez-Weber, “Political Economy”, 45. 
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for future studies of the fundamental determinants of income inequality under 




The narrow question outlined at the beginning of this dissertation asked: “is it 
accurate to assume that trends in inequality in Gran Santiago measured by the 
EOD are nationally representative?” In this dissertation I have argued “no.” By 
using novel social tables and wage data from the National Accounts, I construct a 
Gini coefficient time series for 4 Chilean regions, finding Chilean income 
inequality to have been highly regionally heterogenous in the period 1982-1991. 
Using longer term indicators of internal migration and regional GDP per capita, I 
suggest that this regional heterogeneity probably characterised income inequality 
across the entirety of Pinochet’s rule, not just the second half. 
 
This finding has major implications for our understanding of inequality under 
Pinochet. In estimating regular labour income inequality at a national level, I 
tentatively suggest that national trends in inequality calculated from 
representative sources may produce very different Gini coefficients for the 
Pinochet period. While total income inequality may have increased across the 
1980s, this was not due to changes in regional labour income inequality, which 
actually decreased across the period. Although this is not enough to entirely 
dismiss our current understanding of inequality, which is based on the EOD, I 
make the case that future research should attempt to construct a more 
representative source from which to calculate income inequality. Finally, I 
consider the proximate causes of decreasing labour income inequality in the 1980s, 
arguing that it was a result of decreasing unemployment in the aftermath of the 
1982 crisis. This finding should inform how future studies approach the causal 
relationship between Pinochet’s policies and inequality: candidate causal factors 
must be able to explain a simultaneous increase in total income inequality in Gran 
Santiago and a nationwide decrease in regular labour income inequality. 
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In hoping to answer the broader question of whether Chile’s contemporary high-
income inequality has its roots in the Pinochet period, this dissertation is subject 
to many limitations. Firstly, the time series that I constructed only covers the 
latter half of the Pinochet period and does not cover ex-ante or ex-post trends in 
inequality at all. Furthermore, only partial aspects of income inequality are 
measurable with the sources used in this dissertation, with the focus simply on 
regular labour income inequality across 4 large regions. However, this makes two 
major contributions to the wider debate on whether Chilean income inequality has 
its roots in Pinochet’s dictatorship.  Firstly, I show that the current measures of 
inequality used, the EOD are not representative, before demonstrating that if 
income inequality did increase in the second half of Pinochet’s rule, this was not 
due to changes in relative wages.  
 
Much more work must be done to fully answer the question. The first step would 
be to construct new, nationally representative social tables for the entire Pinochet 
period, ideally splitting Chile into its 13 administrative regions, rather than 4 
aggregated ones. This would not be a simple task, but the success of Rodriguez-
Weber in doing this for the earlier period of 1850-1970 suggests that it might one 
day possible. Then, scholars should attempt to find sources which capture more 
information on non-labour incomes under Pinochet – it is not unreasonable to 
suggest that the tax data needed to do this could one day be found.77 
 
In 2024, 48 years after the creation of Chile’s regional structure, Chilean regional 
governments will be elected by popular vote for the first time.78 This may reflect a 
fitting conclusion to a decades-long process of frustrated attempts to address 
regional inequality in Chile; political authority is being decentralised, and power 
lent to regional governments. Chile may indeed have “woken up”. But historians 
have a long way to go before conclusively deciding when it fell asleep.  
 
77 As mentioned above, Flores et al. show that the tax data for 1980-1986 is currently missing. 
Flores et al., “Top Incomes in Chile”, 7. 
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 February 1985, 528-529. 
 May 1985, 1356-1357. 
 November 1985, 3144-3145. 
 May 1986, 1352-1353. 
 November 1986, 3054-3055. 
 May 1987, 1380-1381. 
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 May 1989, 1419. 
 May 1990, 1251. 
 November 1990, 2833. 
 May 1991, 1356. 
Wage Data 
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Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Familia, MIDEPLAN, Estadísticas de Desarrollo 
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Appendix 1. Example of a social table from the National Accounts 
Employed population by economic activity in the urban and rural sectors, by region and for the whole country 
March 1982 
(Thousands of people) 
Source: Department of Economics, University of Chile 
Economic Activity 
Whole Country Urban Rural 
Total 
Regions  
I to IV 
Regions 








I to IV 
Regions 
V to VII 
Regions 





I to IV 
Regions 







Total Employment 3164.7 295.6 681.5 833.7 1353.9 2468.2 241.7 442.6 490.8 1293.1 696.5 53.9 238.9 342.9 60.8 
Production of 
goods 




633.5 58.9 214.8 274.0 85.7 130.5 25.6 39.4 25.5 40.0 503.0 33.4 175.4 248.5 45.7 
Exploitation of 
mines and quarries 
61.3 26.0 11.9 18.6 4.8 52.9 21.0 8.5 18.6 4.8 8.4 5.1 3.3 - - 
Manufacturing 
industries 
479.5 26.9 80.8 92.2 279.6 449.9 25.7 72.9 73.6 277.7 29.6 1.3 7.8 18.6 2.0 
Construction 179.8 12.9 34.0 42.7 90.2 161.6 11.9 29.5 30.3 89.9 18.2 1.0 4.5 12.4 0.4 
Production of 
Services 
1588.1 142.6 290.4 368.5 786.5 1464.2 130.9 247.5 309.4 776.3 123.9 11.7 42.9 59.1 10.2 
Trade 534.6 56.1 93.5 110.8 274.3 503.5 53.6 83.3 96.1 270.5 31.1 2.4 10.2 14.7 3.8 
Government and 
financial services 
309.8 32.7 62.0 74.8 140.2 272.8 28.8 51.4 53.6 139.1 36.9 4.0 10.7 21.2 1.1 
Personal and 
household services 









and public utilities 
216.4 27.7 49.2 36.6 102.8 203.1 44.2 44.2 32.4 100.3 13.3 1.6 5.0 4.2 2.5 
Activities not well-
specified 
6.1 0.5 0.5 1.0 4.2 6.1 0.5 0.5 1.0 4.2 - - - - - 
 
Source: National Accounts, May 1983, 1238-1239.
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Appendix 2 – Formalised equations for wage multiplier estimation 
 
This appendix presents the formalised equations used to estimate regional 
differences in wages across regions, as outlined in section 3. 
 
Estimate 1 – Real GDP multiplier 
The real GDP per capita multiplier is specified as: 




Where W is the average wage for the sector (s) and M is GDP/Capita for the region 
(r) and the national average (n). 
 
Estimate 2 – Minimum Wage Multiplier 
The minimum wage multiplier is specified as: 




Where W is the average wage for the sector (s) and M is the minimum wage for 
the region (r) and the national average (n). 
 
Linear interpolation of minimum wages, 1984-1987 
To interpolate minimum wages from March 1984 to August 1987, I used the 
equation: 
Interpolated Minimum Wage =  𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 1984 +
𝑀𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 1987 − 𝑀𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 1984
7
 
Where M is the minimum wage for each month and year. 7 is the number of 6-
month periods for which data has to be interpolated, from March 1984 to August 
1987.  
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Appendix 3 – Estimated wage multipliers, 1982-1992 
 
This appendix the results of my regional wage multiplier estimates, as specified 
in appendix 2. National average wages are multiplied by these numbers to give an 
estimate wage for each sector and each region. 
 
Date 
Wage Multiplier 1 (GDP per Capita) Wage Multiplier 2 (Minimum Wage) 
North Centre South RMS North Centre South RMS 
September 1982 0.8119658 0.8336199 1.136331 1.347892 1.068119 1.015361 0.90987 1.066098 
March 1983 0.8005987 0.8672239 1.143746 1.260858 1.068654 1.016237 0.9079143 1.06291 
September 1983 0.8005987 0.8672239 1.143746 1.260858 1.068676 1.01626 0.9078341 1.062933 
March 1984 0.8245194 0.8722513 1.126997 1.247969 1.067207 1.014519 0.9102196 1.066875 
September 1984 0.8237272 0.8722513 1.127262 1.249361 1.067199 1.014524 0.9102178 1.066873 
March 1985 0.8292616 0.8817067 1.108062 1.24045 1.067012 1.014373 0.9099033 1.067466 
September 1985 0.8281603 0.8817067 1.106903 1.242308 1.067006 1.014376 0.909902 1.067465 
March 1986 0.7857821 0.8116013 1.085398 1.211549 1.067189 1.015455 0.9089355 1.06796 
September 1986 0.7857821 0.8116013 1.085398 1.211549 1.067184 1.015458 0.9089345 1.067959 
March 1987 0.7891651 0.7635939 1.060738 1.204592 1.066823 1.015441 0.9087183 1.068443 
September 1987 0.7891651 0.7635939 1.060738 1.207447 1.06682 1.015443 0.9087175 1.068442 
March 1989 0.8388046 0.8352559 1.184249 1.504897 1.066422 1.015404 0.9085969 1.066846 
September 1989 0.8388042 0.8352559 1.184249 1.504897 1.066428 1.015363 0.9085878 1.06691 
March 1990 0.8527021 0.8336015 1.197007 1.291465 1.065402 1.014971 0.9084861 1.069447 
September 1990 0.8527021 0.8336015 1.197007 1.291465 1.073756 1.023 0.9091551 1.053386 
March 1991 1.073932 1.023216 0.908885 1.054026 0.830381 0.8238915 1.220684 1.328953 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on Regional GDP Data, Population Data and Statistical 
Compendiums. 
 
 
